# Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

@article{Gehrlein1976CondorcetsPA, title={Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles}, author={William V. Gehrlein and Peter C. Fishburn}, journal={Public Choice}, year={1976}, volume={26}, pages={1-18} }

Condorcet's paradox [6] of simple majority voting occurs in a voting situation with n voters and m candidates or alternatives if for every alternative there is a second alternative which more voters prefer to the first alternative than conversely. The paradox can arise only if the strict simple majority relation on the alternatives is cyclic, provided that m is finite. Studies of the paradox are usually based either on profiles or A-profiles (anonymous preference profiles). A profile is a… Expand

#### 155 Citations

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